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Abstract 
 
Changing a country’s currency involves a “redenomination risk” arising due to 
assets and liabilities impossible to redenominate because of contracts 
governed by foreign law. Depreciation or appreciation of the new currency 
could, therefore, result in losses or gains, thus creating a risk for economic 
agents. The risk can be estimated by splitting the economy into a Public, a 
Private, a Banking and a Central Banking sector, and summing up exposed 
aggregate assets and liabilities. This method is applied to Greece showing that 
exiting the EMU would certainly entail forbidding redenomination losses for the 
Greek Public sector, leading to default. Surprisingly, however, the impact on 
the Private and the Banking sectors would actually be positive (gain). The 
impact on the Bank of Greece would be ambiguous depending primarily on the 
legal status of TARGET2 liabilities. It is notable that even the Bank of Greece 
possesses a significant cushion in the form of bonds under foreign law. In all, 
the redenomination risk for the Greek economy is modest, with the exception 
of the Public sector. 
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1.The persistent spectre of EMU exit 1 
 
The prospect of currency redenomination emerged in the course of the 
Eurozone crisis and the most likely candidate was Greece. The country faced 
a major crisis as international private capital flows to the Greek state suddenly 
stopped in 2010. For several years public debt was serviced by receiving 
substantial loans from official lenders through three bail-out agreements, in 
2010, 2011 and 2015. Macroeconomic policy was determined by the severe 
conditionality attached to these agreements, subject to periodic reviews by the 
IMF and the EU.  
 
The terms of conditionality were effectively shaped by, first, the absence of 
substantial debt relief, including a debt write-off, and second, the impossibility 
of currency depreciation. Both factors resulted directly from the country’s 
decision to avoid reintroducing its national currency, and thus to remain in the 
European Monetary Union. The main aim of conditionality was to achieve 
stability by eliminating the fiscal deficit as well as the deficit on current account. 
A further aim was to accelerate growth through wage reductions, market 
deregulation and privatisation. 
 
Greece has engaged in severe fiscal contraction since 2010, with front-loaded 
cuts in public spending followed by major increases in taxes. During this period 
monetary and credit conditions also became tight as deposits drained away 
from Greek banks; moreover, banks faced heavy pressures to recapitalise and 
to deal with rising volumes of non-performing equity. Finally, income policy was 
severely restrictive and real wages could reasonably be said to have declined 
by a third since 2010. The combined result was an unprecedented recession 
                                                          
1 Thanks are due to S. Villemot, T. Mariolis, S. Cutillas, and J. Ebbing for comments on the text. All 
errors are the author’s responsibility. 
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cumulatively reducing GDP by a quarter during 2008-2013, while pushing 
unemployment above 27% in 2014. 2 
 
The recession brought a form of stability to the economy since about 2013-14. 
Severe fiscal austerity gradually eliminated the huge budget deficit recorded in 
2010, and after 2016 the country began to show substantial primary surpluses. 
The equally huge current account deficit recorded in 2008 was also greatly 
reduced. Achieving balance in the current account was due to the collapse of 
the domestic economy, which brought a precipitous decline in imports, while 
exports rose very modestly. In sum, stability was gained at the cost of national 
poverty that was heavily borne by wage labour and other low-income social 
strata. There has been no “balanced recovery” in Greece but only a dramatic 
shrinkage of the economy that greatly exacerbated inequality. 
 
Growth has been very weak since 2014, and there is no realistic prospect of 
rapid acceleration making the losses from the recession and reducing the 
enormous unemployment. Especially notable in this respect is the collapse and 
lack of dynamism of investemtn. To make matters worse, the conditionality 
attached to the third bail-out agreed by Greece in August 2015 has forced the 
country to accept further extraordinary fiscal tightness by achieving primary 
surpluses rising to 3.5% of GDP in 2018 and for several years subsequently.  
 
On balance, the Greek bail-out programmes were failures. They have certainly 
reduced the country’s fiscal and external deficits but through tremendous 
contraction of GDP, with attendant social risks, and without creating conditions 
of rapid growth. Greece was made poorer and left in stagnation. Consequently, 
the question of an alternative strategy has never left the policy agenda. Such a 
                                                          
2 The literature on the Eurozone and the Greek crisis is extensive and much of it is not directly relevant 
to our purposes. For the theoretical and empirical analysis that supports this paper, see Lapavitsas, 
Mariolis, and Gavrielidis (2017); for a useful empirical summary of the crisis along more mainstream, 
lines, see Gourinchas, Philippon and Vayanos (2016); for additional penetrating observations on the 
macroeconomic policies applied to Greece, see also Nikiforos, Papadimitriou and Zezza (2016). 
4 
 
strategy would inevitably include a deep restructuring of public debt and a boost 
to aggregate demand to reduce unemployment that would require, at the very 
least, lifting fiscal restrictions. The country would also need targeted industrial 
policy to strengthen the supply side by focusing mainly on its primary and 
secondary sectors. 3 It is immediately apparent that none of these actions would 
be possible without Greece exiting the EMU and reintroducing its national 
currency.  
 
In this respect Greece is only the most extreme case within the EMU. The option 
of exit also emerged at the margins of policy debate for other peripheral 
countries hit severely by the crisis (Portugal, Ireland, and Spain). After 2011 
peripheral countries were stabilised through policies similar, but not nearly as 
severe, to Greece, and thus the issue of reintroducing national currencies 
became less pressing. Moreover, after years of poor economic performance, 
the Eurozone as a whole registered better growth results in 2017. However, its 
fundamental institutional and economic weaknesses have hardly been 
addressed in the course of the crisis, especially the extraordinary current 
account surplus of Germany and the persistent application of fiscal austerity 
across the monetary union.  
 
Consequently, the question of exit with its attendant risks and benefits has 
continued to receive attention, including in core countries. The recovery of 
monetary sovereignty has become a major political cleavage, the relevance of 
which is closely related to the eventual costs and benefits of exiting the euro. 
This is perhaps why it has become a central part of the political debate in both 
France and Italy in the last two years. The French presidential election in 2017 
focused closely on the issue of the euro. Even more strongly, the Italian 
parliamentary elections in 2018 brought into prominence two political parties 
which jointly attracted more than half of the votes and were at the very least 
open to considering exit.  
                                                          
3 See, Lapavitsas, Mariolis and Gavrielidis (2017). 
5 
 
 
The longer-term viability of the common currency remains highly uncertain. It 
is, thus, necessary to consider the likely repercussions of reintroducing national 
currencies, in both peripheral and core countries. Of particular concern are the 
implications of redenomination followed by currency depreciation or 
appreciation. In the case of Greece it is apparent that a new currency would 
depreciate, although for other countries, such as Germany, it might be expected 
to appreciate. For analytical purposes, the effects of exchange rate changes 
could be usefully split between those on flows and those on stocks. For Greece, 
the effect on flows would fall within the classic ambit of currency depreciation 
analysis, including primarily its impact on exports and imports. The effect on 
stocks, on the other hand, is far less clear and forms the specific concern of this 
paper. 
 
The stocks in question are basically monetary sums held or owed by various 
agents in the economy. After switching currency some monetary sums would 
be redenominated but some would remain denominated in the old currency 
because the governing law of their contracts would not allow for currency 
conversion, for instance, bank deposits held by residents with foreign banks. 
Therefore, the ensuing depreciation or appreciation of the new currency would 
affect the wealth of economic agents. The overall impact can also be thought 
of as a “balance sheet effect” which would change the value of the unconverted 
assets and liabilities of economic agents, resulting in either gain or loss of net 
wealth. If wealth changed as a result of redenomination, economic decisions 
could be affected, including consumption and investment. In case of substantial 
losses, for instance, there could be major falls in both consumption and 
investment. That would be a specific “redenomination risk” of exit. 
 
Estimating the “balance sheet effect” of redenomination is a crucial part of 
preparing for EMU exit. By focusing on Greece it is possible to undertake a 
reasonably detailed investigation since the Greek economy has a less complex 
structure than others in the Eurozone, and the nature of the monetary sums 
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held or owed by the fundamental agents is easier to ascertain. However, the 
method followed and the conclusions drawn would facilitate analysis for other 
countries. 
 
In this light, section 2 considers the analytical problems posed by the “balance 
sheet effect” of exiting the EMU; section 3 turns to estimating the 
redenomination risk in general; section 4 estimates the redenomination risk for 
Greece by splitting the economy into four sectors, namely Public, Private (Non-
Financial), Financial and the Central Bank; section 5 considers in further detail 
the redenomination problems for the Greek central bank especially in view of 
its TARGET2 exposure, and concludes. 
 
2. The “balance sheet effect” of exiting the EMU 
 
The basic steps of exiting the EMU and reintroducing a new currency are 
generally understood and need not detain us here, but clearly involve both 
economic and legal issues. 4 The trigger of exit would probably be an Act of the 
Greek Parliament reasserting monetary sovereignty and redefining the unit of 
account under the Lex Monetae. The legal tender of the country would become 
the New Drachma, replacing the euro. The legal repercussions of this action 
and their implications for sovereignty in general, including Greek membership 
of the EMU and the European Union, would be many and complex. 5  
 
However, these complexities need not prevent us from estimating the 
redenomination risk. Suffice it to assume that the Greek state would declare an 
obligatory rate of conversion of the new for the old legal tender, which would 
apply to contracts closely connected with the state. In summary terms such 
contracts could be thought of as governed by Greek law. Two further issues 
                                                          
4 See, for instance, Flassbeck and Lapavitsas (2015). 
5 See Petch and Meloni (2012, ch.4). 
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would then emerge: first, determining the obligatory rate of conversion; second, 
ascertaining the contracts that would fall under Greek law.  
 
Regarding the first, it would be easiest in administrative terms to institute a rate 
of conversion of 1:1 EUR/GRD, although it is certainly possible to adopt 
differential rates aiming for income and wealth redistribution. The conversion 
rate, for instance, could be 1.2:1 EUR/GRD for sums belonging to high-income 
groups and 0.8:1 EUR/GRD for low-income groups. However, the inevitable 
political frictions and the administrative difficulties that would result from such a 
policy cannot be ignored. Even more critical for our purposes is that differential 
rates of conversion would not affect at all the redenomination risk. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this paper, suffice it to assume that the conversion rate 
would be 1:1.  
 
Regarding the second, it should be mentioned at the outset that the relevant 
legal field is large and variable. 6 Τhe euro is the legal tender of Eurozone 
member states, having replaced their national currencies. If a member state 
exited the Eurozone and adopted a new currency, there would be two possible 
outcomes with regard to existing euro-denominated contracts: either payment 
obligations would continue to be payable in euro (under the Lex Monetae of the 
Eurozone member states); or payment obligations would be redenominated in 
the new currency (under the Lex Monetae of the departing member). 
Unfortunately the grey area between the two would be substantial, and thus 
persistent litigation could be expected for a long time after the currency switch. 
7 It could be assumed, for instance, that the bulk of wage and salary contracts 
would fall under Greek law, and hence the conversion would be at 1:1. 
However, financial assets would generally be under both Greek and foreign 
                                                          
6 See Proctor (2010); see also Petch and Meloni (2012, ch. 4 and 5). In Greece there has been very 
little written by lawyers on the issue of exit, with the notable exception of Miliarakis; see, for 
instance, (2015) and (2016).  
7 In this respect see the path-breaking work by Nordwig and Firoozye (2012), further elaborated by 
Nordwig (2014). The approach to redenomination risk in this paper draws on that work. There is 
considerable scope for specialist legal work on this issue. 
8 
 
law, as would be financial liabilities. Therefore, a proportion of both assets and 
liabilities would be impossible to convert and would remain in euro. That is 
precisely the source of the redenomination risk, as was mentioned in the 
previous section. 
 
Strictly speaking, the redenomination risk would arise because after the 
introduction of the New Drachma the currency would probably be devalued in 
the foreign exchange markets. The rate of exchange relatively to the euro would 
be likely to follow a so-called J-curve path, i.e., it would rapidly decline during 
the initial period but gradually recover toward a more stable position. The 
degree of depreciation would not be easy to predict, but note that the Greek 
current account has been broadly in balance since 2015, mostly due to the 
collapse of imports in the course of the recession, thus limiting the potential 
depreciation pressures. However, the degree of depreciation is irrelevant to 
estimating the sources of the redenomination risk although, obviously, the 
deeper the depreciation, the greater will be the resulting change in wealth.  
 
The redenomination risk is important because it contributes to the overall effect 
of currency depreciation on the Greek economy. To be more specific, 
depreciation can be expected to have a positive impact on the flows of the 
Greek economy in the short to medium term, reducing imports, increasing 
exports and giving a boost to aggregate demand and income. 8 In the long term 
the impact of depreciation would be fully absorbed by the price level, but during 
the intervening period the Greek productive sector would have an opportunity 
to restructure itself and capture markets domestically and internationally, 
particularly if the country also implemented an industrial policy capable of 
boosting the manufacturing sector of Greece. This would be a strong benefit 
from the introduction of the new currency.   
 
                                                          
8 See Katsinos and Mariolis (2012).  
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However, the impact of depreciation on monetary and financial stocks, and the 
likely impact of those on economic activity, has not been considered in the 
course of the Greek crisis. In terms of the broader economic literature this 
impact could be considered as a type of “balance sheet effect” characteristic of 
“third generation currency crisis models”. Following the Asian crisis of 1997-8, 
Krugman (1999 and 2000) argued that a depreciation could be contractionary 
if firm revenues were denominated in domestic currency while debts were 
dollar-denominated. A depreciation would then lead to deterioration of balance 
sheets, thus negatively affecting borrowing and investment. The “balance sheet 
effect” has also been discussed in the extensive literature on the causes of 
financial crises, which is not directly relevant to this paper. 9    
 
In this light, depreciation in Greece following the change of currency and the 
redenomination of financial assets would raise the domestic currency value of 
both the assets and the liabilities that would remain denominated in euros. The 
overall “balance sheet effect” might be either positive or negative depending on 
the balance of the unconverted assets and liabilities. Generally speaking, if 
firms or other sectors faced losses, that could potentially affect investment and 
consumption decisions, perhaps even negating the positive direct flow effects 
of depreciation. It is conceivable that the “balance sheet effect” might even be 
enough to generate a recession. This is precisely why it is vital to estimate the 
redenomination risk following exit from the EMU. 10 
 
3. Estimating the redenomination risk  
 
The basic method for estimating the redenomination risk of exit has been 
proposed by Nordvig and Firoozye (2012) and Nordvig (2014). For our 
                                                          
9 Note that there are inherent affinities between the “balance sheet” approach and the approach to 
crisis that draws on Minsky, which are clear in the case of Arestis and Glickman (2002). 
10 Very different outcomes would obtain for a country that faced appreciation of its currency after 
exit, as in the case of Germany. The method of estimation in this paper also applies to Germany.  
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purposes, it has been further developed by Durand and Villemot (2016). 11  
Moreover, important methodological insights can be obtained from Minenna, 
et.al., (2017), particularly with reference to Italian public debt.  
 
The advance made in this paper is to add greater depth and policy detail to the 
estimates by splitting the Greek economy into four sectors and examining the 
aggregated financial accounts of each sector line by line using mostly national 
data. The aim is to identify and sum up the entries that are not expected to fall 
under Greek law, thus remaining in euro, on both the liability and the asset side. 
The difference of Assets minus Liabilities define what is called the Net Relevant 
Position, which is a measure of the net wealth at risk in case of redenomination. 
If the new currency depreciated, there would be losses on unconverted 
liabilities, but gains on unconverted assets. The risk of redenomination, 
therefore, would depend on the size of the Net Relevant Position for each 
sector.  
 
Table 1 summarises the method: 
 
Table 1.  Redenomination risk 
Assets Liabilities 
Under Lex Monetae Under Lex Monetae 
Remaining in euro             A Remaining in euro              L 
 
Thus: 
 
Net Relevant Position:  A - L 
 
                                                          
11 The study by Amiel and Hyppolite (2015) also uses fundamentally the same method but looks only 
at firm-level data and, crucially, ignores the asset side.  
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To estimate the redenomination risk for the Greek economy it helps to split the 
economy into four sectors that would bear the greatest impact from the change 
of currency, namely, the Public Sector, the Private (non-Bank) Sector, the 
Banking Sector and the Bank of Greece. 12 The financial account of each sector 
could then be examined to establish the Net Relevant Position. Finally, by 
considering all sectors together, an assessment could be reached for the 
redenomination risk of the economy as a whole. 
 
Before engaging with the financial account of each sector, however, it is 
important to obtain a picture of the international exposure of Greece by 
examining its International Investment Position (IIP), which is the value of 
foreign assets owned by Greek residents compared to the value of Greek 
assets owned by non-residents. The Net IIP provides a first approximation of 
the exposure of Greece abroad, and hence of the likely impact of 
redenomination. Further general evidence is also adduced by considering Bank 
of International Settlements and World Bank data on Greek external 
indebtedness. The sectorial financial accounts are examined in section 4 to 
ascertain the Net Relevant Positions.  
 
Last but not least, estimating the redenomination risk is similar to hitting a 
moving target, since the balance sheet entries of all sectors change on a 
constant basis. The estimation in this paper has been performed for Greece for 
the third quarter of 2016. The results broadly hold for the subsequent period, 
allowing for strong conclusions. Moreover, the method of estimation remains 
applicable to other countries.  
 
3. International assets and liabilities of the Greek economy 
 
                                                          
12 Strictly speaking the BoG is not a sector of the economy but the size of its balance sheet and its 
importance in the process of exit justify including as a separate sector for our purposes.  
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3.1 Net International Investment Position 
 
Table 2 gives a simplified picture of the International Investment Position of 
Greece in the third quarter of 2016: 
 
Table 2.  Greek International Investment Position, Q3 2016, EURmn 
 
 Assets Liabilities 
Direct Investment 27519 26890 
Portfolio Investment 122573 44211 
Financial Derivatives 1228 9265 
Other Investment 80202 391636 
Reserve Assets 6833  
Total 238355 472003 
Net IIP -233648 
Source: Constructed from BoG, International Investment Position, Quarterly Data, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/externalsector/international.aspx 
 
The Net IIP of Greece, as should be expected for a country that is heavily 
indebted to the rest of the world, is strongly negative. Among the components 
of IIP, the category of Direct Investment is typically governed by the national 
law of the country in which the direct investment takes place, and hence leaves 
practically no scope for redenomination. 13 The category of Financial 
Derivatives is, to all intents and purposes, governed by non-Greek law and it 
would thus also be impervious to redenomination. 14 Fortunately for Greece, 
financial derivatives are a minor component of the country’s exposure, which 
will also be considered briefly below. Finally, the category of Reserve Assets 
                                                          
13 See Nordvig and Firoozye (2012) and Nordvig (2014). 
14 See Nordvig and Firoozye (2012), Nordvig (2014) and also Minenna, et.al. (2017). 
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would remain denominated in euro providing a first port of call for the required 
foreign exchange reserves after redenomination.   
 
The components of IIP that are numerically dominant and matter for our 
purposes are Portfolio Investment and Other Investment. The former comprises 
essentially equity and bond investments; the latter comprises loans by banks 
or, more significantly in the case of Greece, official lenders; Tables 3, 4 and 5 
sum up both in terms of the four sectors.  
 
Consider first Portfolio Investment: 
 
Table 3. Portfolio Investment, IIP, Greece, Q3 2016, EURmn 
 
 EQUITY     DEBT     
 Securities  Investment 
Funds 
  Short-
term 
 Long-
term 
  
 Assets Liab. Assets Liab.  Assets  Liab. Assets Liab.  
     Net     Net 
Public  17 0 3 0 20 0 1161 22 28205 -29344 
Private 185 6892 8022 0 1315 12 0 2467 2158 321 
Banking 153 3964 62 0 -3749 32 0 54778 1144 53666 
BoG 0 0 0 0 0 530 0 45575 0 46105 
Total 355 10856 8087 0 -2414 574 1161 102842 31507 70748 
Net Portfolio Investment 68334 
Source: Constructed from BoG, International Investment Position, Quarterly Data, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/externalsector/international.aspx 
 
Several important points are immediately apparent from Table 3. First, the net 
position of the country is strongly positive; all sectors are also positive, except 
for the Public Sector, probably due to short term Greek bonds held by the 
European Central Bank but also by the private sector. Second, the Private 
Sector holds and has issued insignificant volumes of bonds with regard to IIP. 
Third, both the Banking Sector and the BoG have positive positions. The bond 
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holdings of Greek banks are clearly related to the debt restructuring of 2011-
12, the Private Sector Involvement, as part of which some Greek state bonds 
were swapped for foreign bonds. The most remarkable aspect of Table 3, 
however, are the substantial foreign bond holdings of the BoG, an aspect of 
Greek redenomination that will be examined in further detail in subsequent 
sections. 
 
Consider now Other Investment: 
 
Table 4.  Other Investment, IIP, Greece, Q3 2016, EURmn 
 
 Assets Liabilities  
   Net 
Public  2299 236856 -234557 
Private 52720 15718 37002 
Banking 23099 46438 -23339 
BoG 2077 92624 -90547 
Total 80195 391636 -311441 
Source: Constructed from BoG, International Investment Position, Quarterly Data, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/externalsector/international.aspx 
 
Other Investment is clearly the main source of the negative overall position of 
the country: all sectors are negative, with the exception of the Private Sector. 
Fundamental to it is the overwhelmingly negative position of the Greek Public 
Sector, driven by the bail-out loans obtained since 2010. The position of the 
remaining sectors, however, calls for closer examination in Table 5: 
 
Table 5.  Currency and Deposits, IIP, Greece, Q3 2016, EURmn 
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 Assets Liabilities  
   Net 
Public  0 0 0 
Private 52206 0 52206 
Banking 18740 46438 -27698 
BoG 1357 92624 -91267 
Total  72303 139062 -66759 
Source: Constructed from BoG, International Investment Position, Quarterly Data, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/externalsector/international.aspx 
 
The negative position of the Banking Sector is largely due to the monetary 
liabilities that Greek banks have to other country banks as well as to their 
securitisation liabilities, as will be seen in detail in subsequent sections. The 
positive position of the Private Sector is due largely to its holdings of euro 
banknotes and other deposits abroad. The negative position of the BoG is due 
to the issuing of euro banknotes and, much more significantly, to borrowing 
from the Eurosystem to provide liquidity to Greek banks (mostly TARGET2, i.e. 
liabilities within the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement 
Express Transfer System). These entries present the most complex problems 
of redenomination, and will be discussed in sections 4 and 5. 
 
In sum, the IIP data provides a useful overall and sectorial picture of the position 
of Greece, indicating that the country is heavily indebted abroad but mostly 
through the public sector. The position of the BoG is also strongly negative but 
requires closer investigation. The position of the other two sectors also requires 
more detailed consideration. To this purpose the IIP data is of limited use 
because, first, it lacks sufficient detail and, second, the ownership of assets by 
residents and non-residents does not necessarily correspond to the governing 
law of the specific contracts. A Greek asset owned by a non-resident, for 
instance, could still be governed by Greek law. To ascertain the Net Relevant 
Position of the sectors and of the economy as a whole, therefore, it is necessary 
to consider far more granular data.   
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Before considering detailed evidence from sectorial balance sheets, however, 
it is helpful to sum up general data from the Bank of International Settlements 
as well as from the World Bank. 
 
3.2 BIS and World Bank Data 
 
Table 6 provides a picture of securities outstanding abroad: 
 
Table 6. Stock of international debt securities outstanding, Greece, 
Q3 2016, $bn 
Resident issuers Debt  
  Of which up to and 
including one year 
Banks 29 12.5 
Non-bank financial 6.7 0.6 
Non-financial 3.2 1 
Government 24.9 14.1 
Total 63.8 25.2 
Source: Constructed from BIS Debt Securities Statistics, available at:  
http://www.bis.org/statistics/c3-GR.pdf 
 
According to the BIS, the foreign securities exposure of Greece is almost 
entirely denominated in euro. The difficulty of arriving at reliable figures for our 
purposes becomes immediately apparent when comparing Table 6 to Tables 3 
and 4. What is important from Table 6, however, is, first, confirmation of the 
remaining securities exposure of the Greek government, which most probably 
amounts to the holdings of the European Central Bank (ECB) and, second, the 
very limited securities exposure of the Greek Private Sector.  
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Table 7 provides a picture of the total, or ‘gross’, external debt position of 
Greece: 
 
Table 7 Gross external debt position, Greece, Q3 2016, $mn, 
securities at market value 
 
Total debt  483047 
Among which   
By sector Government 297130 
 BoG 103378 
By instrument   
 SDR 1092 
 Currency and Deposits 154507 
 Debt Securities 36461 
 Loans 280583 
 Trade Credit 798 
 Other Debt 125 
 Direct Investment 9481 
Source: Constructed from World Bank, Quarterly External Debt Statistics, available at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=
Table-1-SDDS-new&Id=4f2f0c86 
 
Once again it is apparent that the publicly available data from international 
organisations requires considerable care before being used for our purposes. 
Still, Table 7 confirms the broad parameters of Greek external debt, including 
the low exposure of the Greek Private Sector, also in terms of trade credit. It is, 
nonetheless, apparent that for a deep analysis of redenomination risk it would 
be necessary to consider sectorial data, including aggregated balance sheets. 
This is undertaken in the following section. 
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4. Sectorial Financial Accounts and Net Relevant Positions 
 
4.1 Public Sector 
 
Consider first the position of the Greek Public Sector which, as is clear from the 
discussion in section 3, has by far the largest exposure abroad driven by the 
public debt. The composition of the Greek public debt is a follows: 
 
Table 8. Composition of Budgetary Central Government Debt, 
Greece, 31 Dec 2016, EUR mn 
 
Bonds and Short-
term notes 
  71607.15 
 Bonds issued 
domestically  
54354.01  
 Bonds issued 
abroad 
2277.07  
 Securitisation 
issued abroad 
86.51  
 Short-term 
notes 
14889.56  
Loans   254750.99 
 BoG 3321.28  
 Other domestic 187.63  
 Special purpose 
and bilateral 
7479.79  
19 
 
 Financial 
Support 
Mechanism 
227660.49  
 Repos  11362.75  
Total   326358.14 
Source: Constructed from Greek Public Debt Management Agency: 
http://www.pdma.gr/attachments/article/37/Bulletin%20No_84.pdf 
 
According to the Greek Public Debt Management Agency, 97% of the debt is 
euro-denominated. 15 By selecting the entries of Table 8 that would not be 
redenominated after a change of currency and by further mobilising the 
evidence from section 3, it is possible to construct the Net Relevant Position of 
the Greek Public Sector. Needless to say, assumptions have to be made and 
judgement exercised in this connection: 
 
Table 9. Net Relevant Position of the Greek Public Sector, Dec 2016, 
EURmn 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Portfolio and 
Other 
Investments  
(from Table 3 and 
4)              
2241 From Loans 
 Special purpose 
and bilateral  
7479.79 
 Financial Support 
Mechanism  
227660.49 
 Other external                       4739.05 
 Total Loans  239879.33 
                                                          
15 Note that in December 2016 there were also roughly EUR13bn of Greek state guarantees to a variety 
of public enterprises and other recipients. These do not directly affect the redenomination risk and 
could be left out of account. See http://www.pdma.gr/attachments/article/37/Bulletin%20No_84.pdf 
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 From Bonds 
 Bonds issued 
domestically 
minus bonds held 
by the ECB, 
estimated at 
28205, from 
Table 3 
26149.01 
 Bonds issued 
abroad 
2277.07 
 Securitisation 
issued abroad 
86.51 
 Short-term notes 
externally held, 
from Table 3 
1161 
 Total Bonds 29673.59 
Total 2241 Total  269552.92 
Net Relevant Position -267311.92 
 
       
The strongly negative position of the Greek public sector is entirely due to the 
bail-out policies applied to Greece. The governing law of the vast bulk of Greek 
public debt in 2010 was actually Greek, but it was systematically switched to 
foreign law as bail-out funds were received. In effect, and as is borne out by 
Table 9, public debt was placed beyond the sovereign power of the Greek state, 
and it would prove impossible to redenominate in the event of exiting the EMU. 
This is a truly extraordinary abdication of power on the part of the Greek state 
in historical terms, which has dramatically worsened the implications of 
redenomination. Under current conditions, in the event of EMU exit the Greek 
government would be obliged immediately to declare default and issue a call 
for negotiations to achieve a substantial debt write-off. 
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4.2 Private (Non-Banking) Sector 
 
Given that there is no aggregated balance sheet of the Private (Non-Banking) 
Sector the only way to assess the relevant redenomination risk is by deploying 
the data from the Greek IIP in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Thus: 
 
Table 10. Net Relevant Position of the Greek Private (Non-Banking) 
Sector, Q3 2016, EURmn 
 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Portfolio and  
Other Investment 
63406 Portfolio and  
Other Investment 
24768 
Of which Currency and Deposits 
52206 
 
Net Relevant Position 38638 
 
     
The limited exposure of the Greek Private Sector to international financial 
markets together with the relatively large amount of Currency and Deposits held 
by the Private Sector imply that the Net Relevant Position is actually 
substantially positive. This is a large buffer that would protect the Private Sector 
from the shock of redenomination but its effectiveness would also depend on 
its distribution among households, enterprises and other institutions. The 
available information on that issue is not detailed enough to allow for an 
assessment, however. 
 
4.3 Banking Sector 
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Analysis of the Net Relevant Position of the Greek Banking Sector should 
depart from the aggregated balance of Monetary Financial Institutions which 
provides a detailed breakdown of sector’s exposed Assets and Liabilities. A 
simplified version of the balance sheet is given in Table 11: 
 
Table 11. Simplified Aggregated Balance Sheet of Greek MFIs, 
December 2016, EUR mn 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Cash   1754 Liabilities to 
BoG 
  66617 
Claims on 
BoG 
  907 Liabilities to 
MFIs 
Of which  24416 
Claims on 
MFIs 
Of which  17488  Domestic 535  
 Domestic 648   Other 
Euro 
Area 
10157  
 Other 
Euro 
Area 
3428   Other 
Countries 
13606  
 Other 
Countries 
13412   Other 117  
Claims on 
non-MFIs 
Of which  206525 Deposits and 
Repos of non-
MFIs 
Of which  157460 
 Domestic 202070   Domestic 132112  
 Other 
Euro 
Area 
2139   Other 
Euro Area 
1718  
 Other 
Countries 
2315   Other 
Countries 
6384  
Securities Of which  62865 Securitisation 
Liabilities 
  17246 
 Domestic 11749  Money Market 
Funds, Debt 
Securities 
  2982 
 Other 
Euro 
Area 
32764  Capital and 
Reserves 
  78436 
 Other 
Countries 
18352  Financial 
Derivatives 
  4424 
Shares and 
Other 
Of which  9347 Remaining 
Liabilities 
  17486 
 Domestic 4246      
 Other 
Euro 
Area 
2193      
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 Other 
Countries 
2907      
Financial 
Derivatives 
  3236     
Remaining 
Assets 
  49699     
Total   351821 Total   351821 
Source: Constructed from BoG, Aggregated Balance Sheet of MFIs excluding the BoG, 
available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx 
 
It is clear from Table 11 that the links between the Greek banking system and 
the rest of the European banking system are weak. The great bulk of bank 
assets comprises domestic loans, although Greek banks also hold a substantial 
volume of non-domestic securities. Most of these were probably issued by 
official lending institutions (mostly European lenders) to replace Greek 
government bonds at the time of the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). The PSI 
was effectively a major “haircut” of Greek public bonds held mostly by domestic 
lenders, which took place in 2011-12. The Asset side, consequently presents 
few problems with regard to assessing the feasibility of redenomination. The 
only significant unknown are Remaining Assets, which are a large part of the 
balance sheet that cannot be categorised by definition. 
 
As for liabilities, once again the great bulk of bank liabilities are to domestic 
agents, mostly private deposits and the BoG. The latter obviously relates to the 
huge provision of liquidity to Greek banks throughout the crisis (some of it in 
the form of Extraordinary Liquidity Assistance) on which more below in 
connection with the balance sheet of the BoG. From the perspective of 
redenomination bank liabilities present few problems, with the exception again 
of Remaining Liabilities, which are significant and, again, cannot be 
categorised.  
 
Thus, the Relevant Position of the Greek Banking Sector would be: 
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Table 12 Net Relevant Position of the Greek Banking Sector, 
December 2016, EUR mn 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Cash 1754 Liabilities to MFIs 
other euro area 
10157 
Claims on MFIs 
other euro area 
3428 Liabilities to MFIs 
other countries 
13606 
Claims on MFIs 
other countries 
13412 Securitisation 
Liabilities 
17246 
Securities other euro 
area 
32764 Financial derivatives 4424 
Securities other 
countries 
18352   
Shares other euro 
area 
2193   
Shares other 
countries 
2907   
Financial derivatives 3236   
Total 78046 Total 45433 
Net Relevant Position 32613 
 
The low exposure of the Greek Banking Sector to international markets and the 
relatively high holdings of bonds that cannot be redenominated entail a large 
positive Net Relevant Position. Whether the positive net position could function 
as a buffer in case of exit from the EMU, however, depends on the legal status 
of the bonds issued by European institutions at the time of the PSI. Note, finally, 
that although Greek banks have relative large assets and liabilities that cannot 
be classified, the Remaining Assets are nearly three times the Remaining 
Liabilities; it is likely that the Net Relevant Position would be positive in this 
respect too. 
 
4.4 Bank of Greece 
 
The most complex problems of redenomination are posed by the BoG which is 
not, of course, a proper sector of the economy but the pivot of the Greek credit 
and monetary system. The BoG is part of the Eurosystem and one of the 
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owners of the ECB. It played a crucial role in the course of the Greek crisis by 
providing liquidity to Greek banks as the latter lost both deposits and access to 
international markets. The liquidity provided by the BoG has been ultimately 
supplied by the Eurosystem, to which the BoG has become heavily indebted. 
The basic mechanism was TARGET2, the performance of which has generated 
a large literature in recent years. 16  
 
Table 13 provides a simplified version of the balance sheet of the BoG to 
facilitate analysis: 
 
Table 13. Simplified Balance Sheet of the Bank of Greece, December 
2016, EUR mn 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Claims on 
MFIs 
  68676 Banknotes and 
coins 
  30728 
Claims on 
non-MFIs 
  7862 Liabilities to 
MFIs 
Of 
which 
 73164 
Securities Of which  58319  To 
Other 
Euro 
Area 
72257  
 Domestic 5041  Deposits and 
repos of non-
MFIs 
  10374 
 Other 
Euro 
Area 
36784  Capital and 
reserves * 
  10635 
 Other 
Countries 
16494  Remaining 
Liabilities 
  18107 
Reserves   4742     
Other   3409     
Total   143008 Total   143008 
Source: Constructed from BoG, Balance Sheet of the BoG, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx 
                                                          
16 TARGET2 will be discussed in section 5 of this article. Suffice it to note that the debate was initiated 
by Hans-Werner Sinn who claimed that TARGET2 credits were a form of financing provided by the 
German Bundesbank to cover current account deficits and capital flight in peripheral Eurozone 
countries, see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012). See Whelan (2012), Buiter and Rahbari (2012) and 
Ceccheti, McCauley and McGuire (2012) for arguments against restricting the provision of TARGET2 
credit by the Bundesbank. See also Tuori (2016) who rightly rejects the idea that TARGET2 is a 
mechanism for redistribution among EMU countries.  
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*As of June 2015, 'capital & reserves' includes current year results and valuation adjustments. 
 
The asset side contains claims on MFIs and non-MFIs (basically the Greek 
government) which could potentially be redenominated, on the assumption that 
claims of BoG on domestic MFIs would be subject to Greek law. Note 
particularly the claims of nearly EUR 69bn on Greek banks largely comprising 
liquidity provision, of which more than EUR 40bn in 2016 was Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA). Note that ELA is provided through the Eurosystem 
but is the responsibility of each National Central Bank, in this case, the BoG. 
The surprising element on the asset side, however, are securities held to the 
value of EUR 53278mn which are non-domestic and would not be possible to 
redenominate. This part of the balance sheet of the BoG appears to be linked 
to monetary policy operations of the ECB and the Eurosystem, and has grown 
systematically since 2013, as is shown in the next section.  
 
On the liability side the BoG has issued EUR 30728mn of banknotes and coin, 
the legal responsibility for which belongs to the Eurosystem and would thus 
remain after the change of currency. Note further that about EUR 13bn of 
banknotes are also held by the Greek public, which are included in the EUR 
18107mn of Remaining Liabilities. This is part of the extraordinary hoarding of 
banknotes in the course of the crisis which has resulted in a further allocation 
of banknote liability to the BoG within the Eurosystem beyond its normal 
allocation. 17 The most significant liability of the BoG, however, is undoubtedly 
that owed to the Other Euro Area, coming to EUR 72257mn which includes the 
TARGET2 exposure of the Greek central bank. The legal status of that 
borrowing is far from clear and merits detailed discussion below. 
 
On this basis, the Net Relevant Position of the BoG is shown in Table 14: 
 
                                                          
17 See Lancaster (2011 and 2016). 
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Table 14. Net Relevant Position of the Bank of Greece, December 2016, 
EUR mn 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Securities, Other 
Euro Area 
36784 Liabilities to 
MFIs, Other Euro 
Area 
72257 
Securities, Other 
Countries 
16494   
Total 53278 Total 72257 
Net Relevant Position, if TARGET2 
could not be redenominated 
-18979 
Net Relevant Position, if TARGET2 
could be redenominated 
53278 
 
In all, the position of the BoG appears surprisingly robust, first, due to the large 
volume of foreign bonds held and, second, because the legal status of 
TARGET2 liabilities is unclear and requires detailed consideration. They are 
both discussed in the remaining part of this paper.  
 
5. TARGET2 and the acquisition of foreign securities by the BoG 
 
Large scale acquisition of securities issued by Other Euro Area and Other 
Countries represents a remarkable change in the balance sheet of the BoG. 
Figure 1 below shows the sudden and rapid growth of these holdings since the 
end of 2013. The sharpest acceleration in acquisitions occurred in the summer 
of 2015, at a time of intense political uncertainty marked by a referendum with 
regard to accepting the third bail-out conditions. 
 
The policy of acquisitions appears to be related to the monetary policies of the 
ECB, above all, Quantitative Easing. The programme of Quantitative Easing 
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started in early 2015 and amounted to massive purchases of government bonds 
by the Eurosystem. By early 2018 total holdings were in excess of EUR 2tr, the 
great bulk of which were held by the National Central Banks that comprise the 
Eurosystem, although the ECB also bought substantial amounts. The BoG has 
participated in the programme and thus expanded its stock of government 
bonds, as is shown in tables 13 and 14. Interestingly enough, that stock might 
act as protective buffer in case of redenomination. 
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Fig. 1. Securities of Other Euro Area and Other Countries held by 
the BoG, EUR mn 
 
 
Source: Constructed from BoG, Balance Sheet of the BoG, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx  
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Further insight into the position of the BoG and the potential role of its stock of 
foreign bonds could be gained by considering the borrowing of the BoG from 
the Eurosystem relative to its own lending to Greek banks in Figure 2:  
 
Fig. 2. BoG Liabilities to Other Euro MFIs plus Remaining Liabilities 
compared to Claims to Domestic MFIs, EUR mn 
 
Source: Constructed from BoG, Balance Sheet of the BoG, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx  
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Liquidity provision by the BoG appears in Figure 2 as Claims on Domestic MFIs. 
BoG liquidity was instrumental in allowing Greek banks to survive the crisis. In 
its absence there is no doubt that Greek banks would have shut their doors, 
effectively forcing a Greek exit from the EMU. Provision of BoG liquidity peaked 
in late 2011 and early 2012 as the Eurozone crisis reached its sharpest point 
for Greece. Provision also increased dramatically after the election of the 
radical SYRIZA government in 2015.  
 
Liquidity provision by the BoG to Greek banks is almost perfectly matched by 
the borrowing of BoG from the Eurosystem, appearing as Liabilities to Other 
Euro Area MFIs. The latter comprises primarily TARGET2, plus the Remaining 
Liabilities of the BoG, which include in large part additional banknotes, as was 
already mentioned. The fit is remarkably close confirming that the BoG, and the 
Eurosystem behind it, acted as suppliers of liquidity of last resort to Greek 
banks in the course of the crisis. As capital flight from Greece ballooned and 
also as the Greek public began to hoard banknotes, Greek banks lost deposits. 
The loss of deposits was made up by liquidity supplied by the BoG, which 
acquired an equivalent liability toward the Eurosystem and other Euro area 
lenders.  
 
The fit, however, became less perfect after the summer of 2015 as the liabilities 
of BoG to the Euro area began to exceed its provision of liquidity to Greek 
banks. That was also the time that the BoG began rapidly to accumulate foreign 
bonds. The gap observed between the two curves reflects the substantial 
foreign bond accumulation by the BoG. Some of the liabilities of the BOG, 
including TARGET2, correspond to a large volume of bonds that would not be 
redenominated in case of Greek exit from the EMU.  
 
Essentially the same point also emerges from Fig. 3, which compares the 
foreign securities acquired by the BoG, shown in Fig. 1, relative to the sum of 
liabilities to other Euro MFIs plus Remaining Liabilities minus the claims by the 
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BoG on domestics MFIs. The fit is manifestly close, indicating again that the 
BoG has been using some of its liabilities to the Euro area to increase its 
holdings of foreign securities. 
 
Fig. 2 BoG Acquisition of Foreign Securities and Corresponding 
Liabilities  
 
Source: Constructed from BoG, Balance Sheet of the BoG, available at: 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/monetary/nxi.aspx 
 
It is possible that this development is purely the result of the BoG participating 
in the Eurosystem and complying with Quantitative Easing. Even so, the 
outcome could substantially change the implications of redenomination for the 
BoG by improving its Net Relevant Position, since these holdings would remain 
primarily in euros. Further legal analysis of the status of these bonds in case of 
EMU exit is desirable. The deeper question remains, however, what would be 
the status of BoG TARGET2 borrowings in case of redenomination? 
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There has been a lively academic and public debate on TARGET2 since the 
outbreak of the crisis as claims and liabilities within the system reached EUR 
1tr in 2016-17. As Tuori (2016, pp. 843-47) notes, while the EMU continues to 
exist, TARGET2 assets and liabilities are merely clearing entries among central 
banks of little significance within the Eurosystem. However, if a country exited, 
the obligations of its National Central Bank would impose losses on the 
Eurosystem. Not surprisingly, the Governor of the ECB in a letter to two 
Members of the European Parliament formally declared that “If a country were 
to leave the Eurosystem, its national central bank’s claims on or liabilities to the 
ECB would need to be settled in full.” 18 There is, nonetheless, reason to doubt 
the validity of the Governor’s claim.  
 
TARGET2 is a payment system with over 1500 direct participants and 16000 
indirect participants or correspondents. It is based on a single technical 
platform, but legally contains 19 separate component systems, one for each of 
the 18 National Central Banks of the Eurosystem, plus one for the ECB. The 
systems operated by the NCBs are governed by the relevant national legislation 
which implements the Settlement Finality Directive. Problems arising from legal 
differences among member-states have been addressed by creating a set of 
Harmonised Conditions. The Decision of the ECB that created TARGET2 states 
that: 19 
 “1. The bilateral relationship between the E.C.B. and participants in 
TARGET2-E.C.B. shall be governed by the law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
2. Any dispute arising from a matter relating to the relationship referred 
to in paragraph 1 falls under the exclusive competence of the courts of 
                                                          
18 Available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/170120letter_valli_zanni_1.en.pdf 
 
19 See Decision of the European Central Bank, 24 July 2007, creating TARGET2 (ECB/2007/7), available 
at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_23720070908en00710107.pdf 
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Frankfurt am Main, without prejudice to the competence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities.” 
 
Thus, although TARGET2 operates on a single technical platform, it is legally 
structured as a multiplicity of systems. Each NCB owns its TARGET2 
component and operates it under its national law. The TARGET2 components 
of individual central banks encompass the Payment Module and the Dedicated 
Cash Accounts on their books. The ECB also owns its own TARGET2 
component and operates it under German law.  
 
Each TARGET2 component is designated under the relevant national 
legislation implementing the Settlement Finality Directive (98/26/EC). However, 
the net positions of the Payment Modules operated by NCBs are settled at the 
ECB Payment Module accounts that NCBs hold with the ECB. The ECB holds 
assets for each net debtor liability of NCBs and vice-versa. Settlements of 
NCBs with the ECB constitute a bilateral relation between NCBs and the ECB, 
as part of TARGET2-ECB. This makes it quite clear that such relations would 
be governed by German Law. Should an NCB default on its obligations under 
TARGET2 to the ECB there would be a process of mobilising collateral 
subsequent to which the ECB would actually recognise a loss and write it off as 
a bad debt. The ECB could then call on its shareholders, i.e., the remaining 
NCBs of the Eurozone to participate in the loss according to their shares in the 
ECB’s capital. 
 
However, neither the German Banking Act, nor European or National laws 
mention the possibility of the Eurozone break-up, nor do they specify the 
procedure for redenominating claims and liabilities to the ECB. The texts refer 
solely to default. In case of a break-up and redenomination it might be possible 
to argue that default of a National Central Bank did not actually take place, and 
thus the provisions for dealing with disputes within the Eurosystem framework 
would not be pertinent. In that case the national Lex Monetae could be 
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applicable to NCBs liabilities with the ECB. It is conceivable that, if the BoG 
stopped being part of the ECB and Greece changed its national legal tender, 
TARGET2 liabilities of the BoG would not be governed by German law, leaving 
open the option of redenomination.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The redenomination risk of Greek exit from the EMU is summed up in Table 14, 
which shows the Net Relevant Position of the four sectors examined in this 
paper:  
 
Table 14 Net Relevant Positions in Greece, December 2016 
Sector EUR mn % of real GDP *   
Public  -267311.92 -144.8 
Private (Non-Banking)  38638 20.9 
Banking 32613 17.7 
Bank of Greece -18978, with TARGET2 -10.3 
Bank of Greece 53278, without TARGET2 28.9 
* Estimated at EUR 184490mn, Hellenic Statistical Authority, available at:  
http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SEL15/- 
 
The results are broadly consistent with those of Durand and Villemot (2016). 
The bulk of the redenomination risk is concentrated in the Public Sector, and 
there is no doubt at all that in the event of exit Greece would have to declare 
default and seek deep restructuring of its public debt. The Net Relevant 
Positions of both the Private (Non-Financial) Sector and of the Banking Sector, 
however, are clearly positive and unlikely to change drastically in the near 
future.  
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From the perspective of the private economy, therefore, the “balance sheet 
effect” of exit is likely to be positive, though the distribution of the effect across 
the Non-Financial and the Banking Sector is likely to be uneven, and hence 
some agents would be adversely affected. The distribution is not possible to 
assess, given the data available at present. 
 
The more unpredictable and complex part of the redenomination risk refers to 
the BoG, and is a result of the support that the central bank has given to the 
Greek Banking Sector in the course of the crisis. The liabilities of the BoG, 
however, have a different legal and economic status compared to the debt of 
the Public Sector, leaving open the question of redenomination. In view 
especially of the accumulation of foreign securities by the BoG during the last 
several years, the position of the BoG is not as weak as it might appear at first 
sight.  
 
In sum, the redenomination risk from Greek exit from the EMU is modest, 
provided that the country was prepared to confront the prospect of state default, 
which would be unavoidable. There is little reason to expect recessionary 
pressures to arise purely because of redenomination. The impact on exports 
and imports, on the other hand, would certainly be beneficial in the short to 
medium term.  
 
Needless to say, Greek exit from the EMU would have profound political 
implications for the domestic structures of authority, especially in view of state 
default. It would also have equally profound international implications as 
Greece would be obliged to default on public debt held by official lenders. But 
the economic benefits to Greece in its current predicament are evident, and the 
economic risks are modest. Moreover, the process would be far less painful for 
all, if it were consensual. A key factor in this respect would be to support the 
Greek banking system and to ensure regular supply of basic goods. Perhaps 
the most critical element, however, would be to limit the depreciation of the new 
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currency. The ECB is perfectly capable of ensuring this outcome, which would 
also reduce the potential losses for holders of Greek public debt. Unfortunately, 
such support is unlikely to be offered to Greece in the foreseeable future. 
Nonetheless, the issue of exit is almost certain to confront Greece and the EMU 
again in the future. It is useful to know that at that time redenomination risk is 
unlikely to be a major concern.  
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